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1. Introduction: Clause Types 
Though individual clause types - especially declaratives, interrogatives, and 
imperatives - have been studied extensively, there is less work on clause type 
systems. 1 This is so despite the fact that clause type systems have properties 
which suggest that they will prove revealing concerning the nature of Universal 
Grammar. For example, we may ask: 
( 1 )  a. Why are some clause types (declaratives, interrogatives, and 
imperatives) universal? 
b. Why are some clause types possible but not universal (e.g . ,  
exclamatives and promissives)? 
c. Why are some intuitively plausible clause types in fact not attested, 
and perhaps not possible (e.g . ,  "threatatives" and "wamatives")? 
The contrast between imperatives and promissives brings out the issue well. 
These two types are functionally very similar: An imperative places a 
requirement on the addressee, while a promissive places a requirement on the 
speaker. Yet imperatives are apparently universal (and at least extremely 
common), while promissives are extremely rare. It does not seem easy to give a 
functional explanation for this contrast, and so in is reasonable to inquire into 
whether an explanation in terms of syntactic or semantic theory is possible. 
Clauses may of course be categorized in a wide variety of ways, and so it is  a 
necessary precondition to the study of clause type systems to have a definition which 
makes clear which types of types we have in mind. Sadock & Zwicky ( 1 985) provide 
a suitable definition. According to them, clause types are universal, form a closed 
system, and are associated with a specific force. We should understand the property of 
universality in terms of ( 1 )  above; the major types are universal , whereas the others 
have noteworthy typological properties. Saying that clause types form a closed system 
is to say that every sentence is a member of one and only one type. This implies , for 
example, that the indicative mood is not a clause type in the relevant sense, since root 
declaratives and interrogatives are typically both declarative/interrogative and 
indicative. The concept of force most frequently invoked, especially in the syntax 
literature, is that of illocutionary force, but this is not accurate. Illocutionary force is a 
communicative-intentional concept, so that (2), used in its stereotypical way, has the 
force of requesting, not asking. 
(2) Would you please pass the salt? 
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Nevertheless, we want (2) to fall under the clause type of interrogative. Therefore, a 
better concept for purposes of explicating the concept of clause type is that of 
sentential force (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990) or sentence mood (e.g .  Reis 
1999). 
The general question we'd  like to address is: How is the sentential force of a 
given clause type arrived at? Two main approaches are found in the literature : 
1 .  Clauses are "typed" (i .e .  marked as belonging to a certain type) through the 
presence of some specialized element, often seen as encoding the force of the 
clause. This element is viewed as residing high in the clausal structure, typically in 
the CP domain (e.g . ,  Baker 1970, Cheng 199 1 ,  Rizzi 1990, 1 996, Rivero & Terzi 
1995,  Han 1998). 
2. Clauses are "typed" through a combination of grammatical properties, as in 
the construction grammar approach (Michaelis & Lambrecht 1 996, Kathol 
2000, Ginzburg & Sag 2001 ). For instance, an interrogative in English might 
be identified as the abstract construction type that can be realized by the 
presence of a wh operator or subject-auxiliary inversion (cf. Ginzburg & Sag). 
Both of these approaches accept the idea that the type of a clause is formally 
represented. This is so whether or not a particular theory proposes that force is 
syntactically encoded. Given that force is in a one-to-one correspondence with 
type, if something represents the sentence ' s  force, this serves to mark the type; 
conversely, if something mark the type, this serves to indicate the force. In 
contrast, we propose that truth-conditional , compositional semantics mediates the 
form-force pairing (cf. Hausser 1980) . That is ,  atoms of morphosyntax contribute 
to meaning in a compositional way, but force is not one of the aspects of meaning 
they contribute. Rather, the result of compositional interpretation is always a 
traditional semantic object like a proposition or property (along with associated 
presuppositions and so forth, of course) . According to our hypothesis ,  force is 
determined only indirectly, on the basis of these meanings . 
2. Imperatives within the Clause Type System 
This paper will focus on imperatives as a case study into the nature of clause type 
systems. In particular, we aim to answer the following two questions :  
1 .  How do the semantics and pragmatics of imperatives fit together with 
what we know about declaratives and interrogatives? 
2.  Why are imperatives, interrogatives, and declaratives the only universal 
clause types? 
Two additional questions concerning the syntax/semantics interface are also of 
interest: 
3 .  What explains the distinctive properties of the imperative subject? 
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4. What explains the distinctive properties of imperatives '  IP/CP syntax? 
Though we will touch on these latter two questions to some extent, space 
precludes us from discussing the syntax of imperatives in any detai1 . 2 
In order to answer the first question - how imperatives are to be related to 
other major clause types - we should begin by reviewing what we know about 
those other types. It is, of course, commonly assumed that declaratives denote 
propositions. Since the work of Stalnaker ( 1974, 1978),  we understand assertion 
as being the addition of a proposition to the Common Ground, the set of 
propositions mutually assumed by the participants in a conversation. The 
sentential force of declarative clauses is assertion, which is to say that they are 
conventionally used to add the proposition that they denote to the Common 
Ground. (The precise nature of this convention is to be explicated further as we 
go along.) 
In parallel to the relationship between declaratives and the Common 
Ground, Ginzburg ( 1995a, b) and Roberts ( 1996) propose that interrogatives are 
associated with a Question Set.3 The elements of the Question Set are 
interrogative denotations, and so on the simple assumption that interrogatives 
denote sets of propositions (Hamblin 1973, Karttunen 1977), the Question Set is a 
set of sets of propositions. The questions in the question set are those which the 
participants in the conversation mutually agree to try to answer; that is, they 
represent issues which the conversation will, ideally, resolve. The conventional 
force of interrogatives, Asking, is then the addition of the set of propositions 
denoted by the interrogative to the Question Set. 
In this context, the natural proposal to make for imperatives is that they 
are associated with a discourse object which is a set of imperative denotations (cf. 
Han 1998, Potts 2003 , Roberts 2004). As a first, intuitive approximation, we can 
say that imperatives represent actions which the addressee should take; 
accordingly, we label this kind of set of imperative denotations a To-Do List. In 
contrast to the Common Ground and Question Set, which are shared among 
participants in a conversation, each individual has her own To-Do List. What is 
shared among participants in a conversation is better modeled as a To-Do List 
Function, a function which assigns a To-Do List to each participant. 
As will be discussed in more detail Section 2, we suggest that imperatives 
denote properties (Hausser 1980), and so a To-Do List is a set of properties. For 
example, the imperative (3) denotes something like the property of leaving:4 
(3) Leave ! 
The conventional force of imperatives, what we can call Requiring, is to 
add the property denoted by the imperative to the addressee' s  To-Do List. To be 
more precise, the force of Requiring must be indexed to the addressee, so that 
RequiringA is the addition of the imperative ' s  denotation to the To-Do List 
associated with A by the To-Do List Function. 
Distinctions among subtypes of imperatives - orders, requests , 
permissions, etc . - should not be understood at the level of conversational force. 
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That is, they all share the force of Requiring, as they all conventionally add a 
property to the addressee ' s  To-Do list. Rather, these differences have to do with 
the pragmatic or sociolinguistic basis for the speaker' s attempt to add a property 
to the addressee ' s To-Do list. Orders occur when the basis is social authority. 
Requests occur when no social authority is invoked, and the basis is the speaker' s 
or addressee ' s  benefit. Permissions occur when the property is understood to be 
one the addressee herself wants on her To-do list. 
Table 1 summarizes the preceding discussion: 
Type Denotation Discourse Component Force 
Dec1arati ves proposition (p) Common Ground Assertion 
set of propositions CG u { p }  
Interrogatives set of Question Set Asking 
propositions (q) set of sets of QS u { q }  
propositions 
Imperati ves property (P) To-Do List Function RequiringA 
function from TDL(A) u { P }  
individuals to sets of 
properties 
Table 1 
Given the ideas in Table 1 ,  we can see why the goal of understanding how 
morphosyntactic form is mapped onto sentential force does not require that force 
be encoded in syntax . We hypothesize that the following: 
(4) The Discourse Context is universally comprised of (at least) three 
components : the Common Ground, Question Set, and To-Do List 
Function. 
(5) a. The generalized update function F = "take a set of x ' s  and another x, 
and add the new x to the set" is universal . (More precisely, F = 
{ <c,<a,r» : For some set X, CE 9'(X) & aE X & r=cu{  a }  } . ) 
b. No other update function is universal , and F is the preferred update 
function in the sense that if F can be used to establish the force of a 
sentence, it must be.5 
Given such universal resources, it is to be expected6 that every language will have 
a type of sentence such that F(Common Ground, II S I I) is defined;7 such 
sentences are dec1aratives . In other words, the sentential force of dec1aratives can 
be deduced from the fact that they denote propositions, and thus are suitable for 
THE SEMANTICS OF IMPERATIVES WITHIN A THEORY OF CLAUSE TYPES 
being added to the Common Ground by the universal update function F. 
Likewise, it is to be expected that every language will have a sentence type such 
that F(Question Set, I I S I I ) is defined; these are the interrogatives . Finally, it is to 
be expected that every language will have a sentence type such that F can use it to 
affect the To-Do List Function. Imperatives play this role .  
An issue we will contend with in more detail in Section 3 .2  is whether the 
universal in (4) is itself explainable in terms of more fundamental considerations,  
or whether it is simply a primitive fact about the human language faculty. Our 
contention is that the former possibility is correct: putting aside the Question Set 
(since interrogatives are not the focus of this paper) , it will be argued that the 
Common Ground and To-Do Lists are related in a tight way, so that a proper 
understanding of what a To-Do List is can only be offered in light of an 
understanding of what the Common Ground is, and vice versa. In other words, 
the Common Ground and To-Do Lists form a package deal - you take either both 
or neither (and if you take neither your language isn ' t  going to be good for much) . 
Therefore the Common Ground and To-Do List Function are universal . 
Returning to the issue of force assignment, in a general sense imperatives 
fit into the picture correctly: they denote properties, and so are added to the 
addressee ' s  To-Do List, a set of properties. However, matters are not as simple as 
with declaratives and interrogatives .  This is so because the hypotheses in (4)-(5) 
are not by themselves enough to predict that every language should have a clause 
type which is used to affect the addressee ' s  To-Do List in particular, rather than 
any other individual ' s  To-Do List. The issue is most pointed with regards to the 
speaker' s  To-Do List: Why are promissives, which are attested in Korean (Pak 
2003 , cf. (20) below) and add a property to the speaker' s To-Do List, rare, while 
imperatives, which differ minimally in affecting the addressee ' s  To-Do List, are 
universal (or at least extremely common)? Though we will not answer this 
question fully in this paper, we will address it further in Section 4.  Our 
speculation is that the typological contrast between imperatives and promissives is 
not semantic or pragmatic in nature, but rather based in syntax. 8 
3. Formal Analysis of Imperatives 
In this section we will discuss the semantics and, especially, the pragmatics of 
imperati ves in more detail . 
3. 1 .  Semantics of Imperatives 
We hypothesize that an imperative denotes a property which can only be true of 
the addressee. For example, (6) denotes the property in (7) ,  where c represents 
the context of utterance, w* is the world of evaluation, and we set aside other 
indices such as temporal ones for simplicity: 





I I  Leave ! I Iw*,c = [AWAX :  x = addressee(c) . x leaves in w] 
The condition that the argument x is the addressee is given as a domain 
restriction, so that this function returns neither true nor false when applied to 
individuals other than the addressee. In any world in which the addressee leaves, 
the addressee is the only individual to have this property; in any world in which 
the addressee doesn' t  leave, nobody has this property. Section 4 contains more 
discussion of how this interpretation is arrived at in a compositional way (see also 
Portner 2003a, 2004a, b and Zanuttini 2004 for discussion). 
Given the semantics in (7),  we can explain in more detail how force is 
assigned to an imperative clause. Since an imperative denotes a property, it i s  not 
suitable for being added (by F in (5)a) to the Common Ground or Question Set.9 
It is suitable for being added to a To-Do List. Since it is a property which can 
only be true of the addressee, it would not be felicitous to add it to the To-Do List 
of any individual other than the addressee; no other individual can do what (6) 
says, and an order isn ' t  felicitous if it' s known in advance that it cannot be 
followed. Therefore, the force of (6) must be to add the property in (7) to the 
addressee ' s  To-Do List. 
The hypothesis that imperatives denote properties can help us understand 
why (8)a is not a possible imperative: 
(8) a. *Mary kiss (you) ! 
b. (You) be kissed by Mary ! 
A common idea about imperatives is that they denote propositions and that they 
contain a "force marker" indicating that this proposition is used to place a 
requirement on the addressee. Such a view runs into difficulties with the fact that 
(8)a and (8)b have the same propositional content. It' s  hard to see, then, why a 
force marker couldn't  combine with either one equally well , thereby creating an 
imperative. The problem with (8)a could be seen as simply due to a syntactic 
requirement that the subject of imperatives be second person, but this is doubtful 
as evidenced by the possibility of third person imperatives like (9)a. Indeed, the 
very sequence of words in (8)a can be used as an imperative if it is embedded in a 
contrastive structure, as in (9)b, but notice the reSUlting sentence implies that 
Mary is among the set of addressees: 
(9) a. Everyone sit down ! 
b. MARY kiss YOU [pointing] and JOHN kiss YOU [pointing] ! 
The idea that imperatives denote properties formed by abstracting over the subject 
argument allows an explanation of the contrast in (8). Whereas a null subject or a 
pronominal subject like that in (8)b can be abstracted over, yielding the property 
of being kissed by Mary, the subject of (8)a cannot be. Therefore (8)a cannot be 
given a proper imperative denotation. In (9)a, what is abstracted over is a covert 
domain variable for everyone, while in (9)b contrastive focus introduces a 
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variable for the set of addressees (something like "Mary, in contrast to the others 
in set X, where X=the set of addressees"). 
Section 4 will discuss how simple imperatives are assigned the meaning in 
(7), in particular focusing on the nature of the imperative subject, and will also 
examine the difficult examples like those in (9) in a bit more detail .  At this point, 
the primary motivation for treating imperatives as denoting properties is the fact 
that this approach allows the force of imperatives to be derived in the way 
indicated above. As we tum to the pragmatics of imperatives in Section 3 .2,  it 
should be noted that the analysis developed there would be compatible with the 
idea that imperatives denote propositions, as is ordinarily assumed. Further 
motivation for their treatment as properties will come in Section 4 .  
3.2 .  Pragmatics of Imperatives 
This section aims to address two issues . The first concerns the nature of To-Do 
Lists . Like the Common Ground and Question Set, the To-Do Lists are part of a 
model of how language fits into interaction. But a To-Do List is formally just a 
set of properties, and so the question arises of how this set is to be understood as 
helping to model interaction. The second issue was brought up in Section 2, and 
is related to the first. We have hypothesized that the To-Do List Function, like 
the Common Ground and Question Set, are universal. In this section, we will 
examine whether its universality is to be expected given its role in modeling 
interaction. 
The fundamental hypothesis of this section is that the roles of the 
Common Ground and To-Do Lists are tightly integrated. The Common Ground 
provides a background of "live possibilities", possible worlds which might be 
actual as far as the participants in the interaction are concerned. The interaction 
proceeds against this space of possibilities . An individual ' s  To-Do List then 
orders the possibilities compatible with the Common Ground, ranking some as 
preferable to others . The individual ' s  actions are then judged according to the 
extent to which they tend to make it the case that the actual world is among the 
higher-ranked possibilities. 
Before getting into formal details, some analogies to other topics in 
semantics should help clarify the relationship between the Common Ground and 
To-Do List. First we can compare imperative semantics to modal semantics; in 
terms of Kratzer' s  ( 199 1 )  theory of modality, we can relate the Common Ground 
to the Modal Base, and the To-Do List to the Ordering Source. Consider the 
deontic modal example ( 10) : 
( 10) Mary must pay a $20 fine. 
Example (10) is interpreted with respect to a circumstantial Modal Base 
representing a set of facts. The facts circumscribe a set of relevant possible 
worlds (worlds in which Mary received a ticket for illegal parking, let ' s  say) . The 
relevant possible worlds are then ranked according to a deontic Ordering Source 
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representing the laws of the place in which she parked. According to these laws, 
among the worlds compatible with the Modal Base, ones in which she pays the 
fine are most highly ranked, and on this ground ( 10) is true. 
Another analogy, and one which brings us closer to the particular case of 
imperatives, concerns the semantics of desire predicates (e.g . ,  Heim 1 992, Villalta 
2000). Let us consider the example in ( 1 1 ) :  
( 1 1 )  Mary wants to visit the Dolomites. 
Example ( 1 1 )  is  interpreted with respect to a background set of propositions 
representing Mary' s beliefs. These beliefs provide a space of open possibilities, 
worlds which might be real as far as Mary is concerned. Within this space, 
Mary' s  desires rank the various possibilities. Example ( 1 1 )  will be true if her 
desires rank visiting the Dolomites more highly than the other open possibilities. 
The analogy to the pragmatics of imperatives should be apparent: Mary' s beliefs 
correspond to the Common Ground, and her desires correspond to the To-Do List. 
A third analogy is closely connected to the preceding one, and is revealing 
as it takes us out of the domain of semantics and into one more relevant to 
pragmatics. Philosophers such as Stalnaker ( 1984) and Lewis ( 1986) have sought 
to ground possible worlds semantics in a theory of rational action based on an 
idealized belief-desire psychology. The basic idea is that we judge an agent' s  
actions to be rational to the extent that they will tend to bring i t  about that the 
world is as the agent desires, given what the agent believes. As was the case with 
( 1 1 ) ,  the beliefs and desires can be modeled in terms of possible worlds, so that 
the beliefs demarcate a space of live possibilities, and the desires rank those 
possibilities. Roughly speaking, the agent' s  actions are rational to the extent that, 
if undertaken in any of the worlds which are considered live possibilities, they 
would tend to bring it about that this world becomes maximally highly ranked. 
We may think of the Common Ground and To-Do List as being the public , 
or interactional, counterparts of the individual agent' s  beliefs and desires. That is, 
as far as the participants in an interaction go, an agent' s  actions will be judged 
rational to the extent that, if undertaken in any world compatible with the 
Common Ground, they would tend to make this world maximally highly ranked 
according to that agent' s  To-Do List. To take a simple example, suppose that it is 
in the Common Ground that a certain door leads outside. A tells B "Go outside 
right away !" ,  and B does not object to the order. In that case, if B opens the door, 
his actions will be judged rational in a straightforward way. If he sits down in a 
chair and closes his eyes, his actions might be judged irrational . 1 0  
We can now tum to a formal implementation of these ideas . TDL(i) 
represents the To-Do List of individual i and CG represents the Common 
Ground: 1 1 
( 12) Partial Ordering of Worlds: 
For any W I ,  w2E nCG, wl<iw2 iff for some PE TDL(i) ,  P(w2)(i)=T and 
P(w l)(i)=F, and for all QE TDL(i), if Q(w l )(i)=T, then Q(w2)(i)=T. 
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Definition ( 1 2) defines a partial order « i) on the worlds compatible with the 
Common Ground (nCG). Note that if we have w I <iw2, w2 is the "better" world. 
With this definition as background, we define the key pragmatic concept: 
( 1 3) Agent's commitment 
For any agent i, the participants in the conversation mutually agree to 
deem i's actions rational and cooperative to the extent that those actions in 
any world WI E nCG tend to make it more likely that there is no w2E nCG 
such that W I <iw2. 
According to ( 12)-( 13) ,  to be judged rational an agent must attempt to make as 
many properties on her To-Do List true as possible. 1 2  An alternative way of 
approaching the interpretation of imperatives might be to say that the agent will 
be judged rational to the extent that her actions tend to make it the case that the 
world is one in which all of the properties on her To-Do List are true. That this is 
not the right way to go can be seen by considering what happens when an 
individual receives conflicting orders . Such a situation does not lead to every 
action, or no action, being seen as rational . Rather, it is rational to seek to make 
as many To-Do List properties true as possible, and this is reflected in the 
definitions above. 
The definitions in ( 12)-( 13) make clear the way in which the Common 
Ground and To-Do List are tightly integrated. Together they serve to define the 
relationship between what participants in a conversation say and what they can be 
expected to do. Since it seems likely that one of the fundamental - if not the 
fundamental - function of language is to allow us to use words to coordinate our 
actions, the To-Do List and the Common Ground seem essential to language. 
This is why the To-Do List Function is universal . 
4. Imperatives and Promissives 
This section focuses on two puzzles left over from preceding sections. One 
question is why imperatives are typologically so much more prominent than 
proffilsslves. This difference is surprising given that their semantics and 
pragmatics are so similar; in terms of the theory presented in this paper, they both 
denote properties which are added to a To-Do List, the difference being whether it 
is the speaker' s or addressee ' s  To-Do List. (Any other theory of promissives is 
likely to treat them as quite similar to imperatives in its own terms.)  
Another open issue is how the semantics of imperatives in (7)  -
imperatives denote a property which can only be true of the addressee - is 
compositionally arrived at. We believe that this question is closely related to the 
previous one; we will suggest that the typological difference between imperatives 
and promissives has its basis in syntax . Therefore, in this section we will begin 
by considering the compositional interpretation of imperatives, focusing in 
particular on the imperative subject. 
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4. 1 .  The Imperative Subject 
We have hypothesized that imperatives denote properties, in particular properties 
whose argument is restricted to the addressee. There are a couple of ways one 
could seek to arrive at such a denotation compositionally. One possibility would 
be that the subject argument of imperatives is never saturated. For example, it 
could be that the verb in ( 14) has the meaning in ( 1 5)a (leaving out intensionality 
for the moment). Then, somehow, the domain restriction 'x = addressee(c) '  is  
added to yield ( 1 5)b. 
( 14) Leave ! 
( 1 5) a. [AX .  x leaves] 
b. [AX :  x = addressee( c) . x leaves] 
An alternative possibility is that the subject of the imperative clause is saturated, 
but then abstracted over later on. While the first possibility seems plausible for 
simple imperatives with null subjects , it is difficult (though not impossible) to see 
how to handle overt subjects in these terms, especially third person referential and 
quantificational ones like ( 16)b-c : 
( 16) a. You be quiet ! 
b .  Everyone sit down ! 
c .  JOHN stand HERE and MARY stand THERE! 
Because of examples like those in ( 1 6) ,  we analyze the imperative verb as having 
a fully saturated argument structure. A covert variable-binding operator high in 
the clausal structure converts the imperative clause into a property-denoting 
expression. In simple cases like ( 14) and ( 16)a, the subject argument is abstracted 
over. In ( 16)b-c, the situation is more complex; in ( 16)b a covert domain­
variable for the quantifier is abstracted over, while in ( 16)c the contrastive focus 
somehow provides a variable for the operator to bind. The resulting meanings are 
something like ( 17)a-c : 1 3  
( 17) a. [AWAX :  x = addressee(c) . x is quiet] 
b. [AWAX :  x = addressee(c) . [\ty : ye x . y sits down] ] 
c .  [AWAX :  x = addressee(c) . Johne x & John stands here & Marye x & 
Mary stands there] 
If this way of looking at the syntax-semantics interface of imperatives is 
correct, the imperative subject is unique among root subjects in that it must either 
be or be associated with a variable which is bound. 14 This raises two additional 
questions: First, what is the nature of this variable? And second, what is the 
formal status of the requirement that imperative subjects be or be associated with 
it? This paper will only address the first question. 
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We propose that the variable - referred to loosely as "the imperative 
subject" in what follows - is an addressee-oriented logophoric pronoun. Such a 
suggestion allows us to make sense of the properties of the imperative subject. 
Within the recent fonnal analyses of logophoricity of Schlenker ( 1 999, 2003) and 
von Stechow (2002), logophoric pronouns are pronominal elements always bound 
by covert variable-binders ; they always have indexical meaning like ' is the 
speaker of context c ' .  In both of these ways, they are like the imperative subject. 
Of course the special property of logophoric elements, that their indexical 
meaning does not locate their reference in the actual speech situation, but rather in 
a linguistically introduced speech situation, is not typically reproduced with 
imperatives, because they cannot be embedded. However, in Korean we do find 
embedded imperatives, and as expected their subject is interpreted with respect to 
the reported speech act (from Pak 2003) :  
( 1 8) Emma-ka mek-u-Ia mal-ha-si-ess-ta 
Mom-NOM eat-IMV -Comp say-do-SH-PST -DEC 
'Mom told (me) to eat. ' 
Crucially, ( 1 8) does not mean 'Mom told you to eat' , but rather 'Mom told the 
person she was addressing to eat' . This shows that the subject of an imperative, 
while addressee-oriented, is not tied to the actual speech context in the way that 
an ordinary indexical like you is .  
The idea that the imperative subject is a logophoric pronoun may also 
contribute to an explanation for why English imperatives may have a null subject. 
This fact is surprising, given that Standard English root clauses typically do not 
allow null subjects . However, if the imperative subject is in fact not an ordinary 
pronoun, but rather a logophoric element, it is less surprising. The logophoric 
pronoun is a distinct lexical item from ordinary pronouns, and so there ' s  no 
reason it should not happen to have null phonological fonn. 
4.2. The Person Features a/the Imperative Subject 
In light of the analysis of imperative subjects, we are now in a position to say 
more precisely what distinguishes imperatives from closely related clause types 
like promissives. Whereas the imperative subject adds the descriptive content 'is 
the addressee' to the sentence ' s  meaning, the subject of a promissive adds the 
descriptive content 'is the speaker' . Another closely related type, hortatives, adds 
the content 'is the speaker and addressee' . We see all three types exemplified in 
Korean (from Pak 2003): 
( 19) IMPERATIVE 
Cemsim-ul mek-e-Ia. 
Lunch-ACC eat-IMV 
'Eat lunch ! '  
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(20) PROMISSIVE 
Nay-ka nayil cemsim-ul sa-rna. 
I-NOM tomorrow lunch-ACC buy-PRM 
'I will buy you lunch tomorrow. '  
(2 1 )  HORTATIVE 
Icey cemsim-ul mek-ca. 
Now lunch-ACC eat-EXH 
'Now, let us eat lunch. '  
Another revealing language i s  Sanskrit, which has a full person paradigm for 
imperatives . First person singular imperatives seem to be interpreted as promises 
(from Mauck et al . 2004) : 
(22) AavyuSam jaagrtaat aham. 
daybreak watch-IMP. ls I 
'I will watch until daybreak' (A V 144) 
One might suggest that imperatives are universal while proffilsslves are not 
because the kind of subject needed for imperatives, the addressee-oriented 
logophor, is universal, while the kind needed for promissives, the speaker­
oriented logophor, is not. This solution seems unlikely, however, because 
speaker-oriented logophors are generally more common than addressee-oriented 
ones. A more promising possibility is to focus on the operator which binds this 
element, abstracting over it to make the clause denote a property. Perhaps 
Universal Grammar provides an operator which can bind an addressee-oriented 
logophoric element. This operator allows the generation of properties whose 
argument is restricted to the addressee, i .e. imperatives . According to this way of 
thinking, a parallel operator for binding the speaker-oriented logophoric element 
is present in Korean, but it is not universal . I 5 
The idea that imperative clauses contain a special operator might receive 
some syntactic support from the well-known fact that imperative verbs are often 
in a higher position than declarative verbs. For example, the Italian imperative 
(23) has the verb to the left of the clitic ti, whereas in declaratives it would follow: 
(23) Siediti ! 
Sit.IMP-refl.2sg 
'Sit ! '  
Syntactic accounts often account for the position of the verb b y  postulating a 
force feature in the CP domain which drives verb movement. While we are 
skeptical of a force feature for reasons mentioned above, a similar explanation can 
be given in terms of the variable binding operator. We speculate that this operator 
resides hi�h in the clausal structure and triggers verb movement in many 
languages. 6 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has tried to accomplish two things : 
1 .  It has aimed to present some general issues relevant to the study of clause 
type systems, and to outline a framework which makes sense for thinking 
about these issues. Clause type systems have noteworthy typological 
properties, and in particular we need to explain why some types are 
universal , some are possible, and some are unattested and perhaps 
impossible. We have proposed that the universal types are each associated 
with a universal component of the discourse context (the Common 
Ground, Question Set, and To-Do List Function). The universal procedure 
for updating these components is simply to add a semantic object of the 
right type to one of them. All of this is just a generalization of Stalnaker' s 
original ideas about the Common Ground to the other universal clause 
types . 
2. In the context of this framework, the paper has made some specific 
hypotheses about the syntactic ,  semantic ,  and pragmatic analysis of 
imperatives .  Imperatives denote properties which can only be true of the 
addressee, and this allows for a pragmatic derivation of their force which 
dispenses with the need for a "force marker". The force of imperatives is 
to add a property to the To-Do List of the addressee. Through the use of 
techniques familiar from modal semantics and the semantics of desire 
predicates, a To-Do List is used to rank the possible worlds compatible 
with the Common Ground. The Common Ground in combination with the 
ranking generated by the To-Do List provides a model for the relationship 
between what people say and what they can be expected to do as rational 
agents . 
There are a number of open problems, and the most significant of these have to do 
with the nature of the imperative subject. At one level , we do not understand 
fully the syntactic or semantic nature of this element; this paper has suggested 
that it might be an addressee-oriented logophoric pronoun. More fundamentally, 
we do not understand why this element - whatever it is - is universal and how it 
becomes associated with the other morphosyntactic properties of imperatives . For 
example, we do not understand why a null subject is impossible in Standard 
English root sentences unless the verb has the bare imperative form. This point 
makes clear the fact that a complete understanding of the semantics and 
pragmatics of imperatives is not possible without a detailed understanding of their 
syntax as well . 
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Endnotes 
*This paper is part of a collaborative project with Raffaella Zanuttini supported 
by NSF grant BCS-0234278, 'Clause Types: Form and Force in Grammatical 
Theory' .  We especially thank Miok Pak and Simon Mauck for their 
contributions. We have received helpful feedback from audiences at ZAS in 
Berlin, the University of Padua, Northwestern University, Stanford University, 
and SALT 14. 
1 An important paper which sets up many of the important issues is Sadock & 
Zwicky ( 1985) .  Recent work which addresses the syntax/semantics! pragmatics  
interface in a way similar to the present approach is Ginzburg & S ag (2001 )  and 
Roberts (2004); cf. Hausser ( 1980), Zanuttini & Portner (2003), Potts (2003). 
2 Zanuttini (2004) contains relevant discussion. 
3 According to some authors, instead of a simple set, we have a more structured 
object such as a Question Under Discussion Stack (Ginzburg). This difference is 
not relevant to us here. 
4 This is not quite accurate, but it is sufficient for present purposes.  We will give 
a more precise characterization in Section 3 .  
5 The subtleties of (5)b are not of direct concern here, but they become relevant 
when we think about such minor clause types as exclamatives . Zanuttini & 
Portner (2003) argue that exclamatives denote sets of propositions, like 
interrogatives. However, they are also associated with a factive presupposition 
which makes them unsuitable for addition to the Question Set. Therefore, another 
update function (what we call Widening) is employed. 
6 It ' s  not logically required, however. It ' s  logically possible that a language 
would leave a discourse component unused. More realistically, it' s possible that a 
language would only have the means for updating a particular discourse 
component through indirect speech acts ; for example, one could lack imperatives 
and update To-Do Lists through interrogatives like Can you pass the salt ? 
However, given that the morpho syntactic resources for making the major clause 
types are probably universal, it' s not surprising that every language would have a 
direct means of updating each discourse component. 
7 I use " S " here for the denotation of S ,  and I leave parameters of interpretation 
out because it' s not relevant exactly what the parameters of interpretation are. 
8 The only plausible functional explanation I can think of involves children' s  
conceptual development during language acquisition. Perhaps at the point when 
the grammatical resources to affect the To-Do List become available, children can 
understand what it is to affect someone else ' s  To-Do List, but not what it is to 
affect their own. This idea represents pure speculation, however. 
9 Thanks to Manfred Krifka (p.c .)  for suggesting this pragmatic reasoning. 
10 In more complex cases, we can see that a principle of charity is operative in 
judging agents ' actions. Suppose that there were two doors, one leading outside 
and another opening into a bathroom. If B were to open the second door, his 
actions might be judged irrational, but more likely A would assume that B 
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understood the temporal semantics of Go outside right away! to allow for a brief 
bathroom break. This type of charity principle is typical in pragmatic reasoning, 
as seen in the flouting of Gricean maxims. As is well known, when an utterance 
apparently violates a maxim, interlocutors typically reinterpret it via implicature 
so as to bring in into conformity with the maxim. Maxims are never really 
violated except in truly pathological cases. Likewise, it seems to me that an 
agent' s  actions, measured against the To-Do List, are not often going to be judged 
irrational . Rather, rationality is an assumption onto which interlocutors hold 
�retty firmly, reinterpreting other aspects of the situation if necessary. l One issue not discussed here is the status of conditional imperatives like (i) :  
(i) If you see Mary, come home right away ! 
The force of this sentence is to place the main imperative clause ' s  property (come 
home right away) onto the addressee' s To-Do List only once the ifclause (you see 
Mary) is true. What is difficult is to find of way of implementing this which fits 
with the semantics of conditionals generally. While I don' t  have a solution, I note 
that (i) may be related to relevance conditionals (Austin 1 96 1 ,  latridou 199 1 ,  
sometimes called speech act conditionals among other things) like (ii) :  
(ii) If you know about gardening, where would be a good place to plant the 
roses? 
1 2 If two properties P and Q on i ' s  To-Do List are incompatible, worlds in which i 
has P and worlds in which i has Q will actually not be commensurable. But if i 
can have both P and Q, then worlds in which he has both will be more highly 
ranked than worlds in which he has only one. Because of space, I must leave the 
detailed implications of the definitions to the reader. 
1 3 Note that ( 16)c is only possible on an contrastive interpretation of John and 
Mary. Therefore, the meaning in ( 17)c is very approximate, and this  example' s  
correct analysis must make use of a realistic semantics for focus. 
14 Control infinitives have a similar property, of course; their subject, PRO, must 
be bound. This similarity is probably not accidental , but it' s difficult to know 
exactly what to make of it at this point. 
1 5 Notice that, according to the theory of Schlenker ( 1999, 2003) and von Stechow 
(2002), regular logophors are bound by operators introduced by propositional 
attitude verbs. This mechanism is certainly not available in all languages. The 
imperative operator is introduced in root clauses, without a licensor like an 
attitude verb. 
1 6 The syntactic issues here are complex, and this paper only offers a hint as to 
how we might approach them. One important problem is that not all imperatives 
show the same position of the verb, even within a single language. For example, 
negative second person singular imperatives in Italian, which employ the 





Non mangiarlo ! 
neg eat-it 
'Don' t  eat it ! '  
Non 10 mangiare ! 
neg it eat 




This kind of data is at least as problematical for theories which invoke a force 
marker as it is for our account. See Portner & Zanuttini (2003) for discussion. 
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